

**TOP SECRET**

29 April 1959

Copy No. C 55

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 40  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Y  
DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: 10 S 2010  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 4.14.80  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 4.14.80 REVIEWER:

State Dept. review completed

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400400001-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400400001-8

25X1

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

29 April 1959

### DAILY BRIEF

25X1

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1

Tibet: (Chinese Communist forces have by now probably broken up concentrations of rebels in southeastern Tibet, although the terrain permits continued activity by small groups.

25X1

25X1

OK

[redacted] the Chinese are trying to seal the main passes on the southern Tibet border and have blocked the escape route used by the Dalai Lama. Possibly 5,000 Tibetan refugees have so far entered India and Bhutan, but it will now be increasingly difficult to cross the border. Sino-Indian relations continue to deteriorate.) [redacted]

25X1

\*USSR--Nuclear test talks: The Soviet delegate to the Geneva talks stated on 28 April that if the number of inspections of suspected nuclear explosions to be permitted each year is agreed upon in advance, the USSR will drop its demand for a veto on the dispatch of inspection teams. In addition, the USSR will agree to permanent inspection groups in the USSR, and permit automatic inspection when control-system instruments indicate a suspicious event. However, the Soviet representative contended that the annual number of inspections to be allowed was a political decision and not related to any technical information or report. In his 23 April letter to President Eisenhower, Khrushchev said there would "naturally" be few such inspections.

OK

25X1

25X1

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO  
Turkey-Iraq: (Ankara is increasingly concerned over the gravity of the Communist threat in Iraq and its implications for Turkish security. Prime Minister Menderes has requested immediate US-Turkish talks on the question. Meanwhile, Turkish officials have announced that 700 Kurdish tribesmen from Iraq have been granted asylum. These are the first refugees noted crossing this border.)

25X1

25X1  
[Redacted]

OK  
Singapore: (Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock's efforts to unite moderate forces to oppose the Communist-infiltrated People's Action party in the 30 May general elections have thus far failed. The moderates have nominated a large number of competing candidates. In contrast, the People's Action party has filed a strong slate of candidates restricted to one for each assembly seat.)

25X1

## III. THE WEST

25X6

29 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
Panama: The armed invaders apparently have not gained the local support which they expected from opponents of President de la Guardia. Prompt reaction by the Organization of American States and the delivery of US military equipment to the National Guard have thus far deterred opponents of De la Guardia who might otherwise have moved against him.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

OK The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):

1. There are as yet no clear indications of Soviet negotiating tactics at Geneva: (a) By such moves as the 21 April notes to the US and West Germany, the USSR is seeking to divide the Western allies and soften Western positions. The Soviets are also preparing the ground for blaming the West for any failure to reach agreement. (b) While there are no clear indications of what will emerge from the meeting of bloc foreign ministers at Warsaw, it appears to be intended primarily as a demonstration of bloc unity and a counter to the Paris meeting of the Western foreign ministers.

3. (Prime Minister Macmillan's clear indication that he will not call general elections this spring will tend to increase the pressure on his government to seek a negotiated settlement of the Berlin crisis.)

4. While the USSR will not turn over access controls to East Germany in the near future, the physical transfer could be accomplished with little or no warning.

5. There are no reliable indications of a bloc intent in the near future to blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the bloc. However, the Soviets could take such actions with little or no warning.

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400400001-8

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400400001-8

25X1

Tibetan Situation

(All concentrations of Tibetan rebel forces have probably been broken by Chinese Communist troops driving into the Khamba-occupied area of southeastern Tibet, [REDACTED])

25X1

[REDACTED] Despite Peiping's intense effort to crush the revolt, however, the rugged terrain and availability of local food sources will permit continuing activity by small rebel bands.

25X1

[REDACTED] the Chinese were making every effort to seal Tibet's borders with Bhutan, Nepal, and India. They have blocked the escape route used by the Dalai Lama, he said. Possibly 5,000 refugees, however, have succeeded in reaching Bhutan or India within recent weeks, and small groups are expected, with increasing difficulty, to continue straggling across the border.)

Sino-Indian relations have deteriorated to their lowest level in years. The National People's Congress heard a parade of speakers charging Indian officials with "expansionist" denial of China's sovereignty over Tibet and with complicity in the Dalai Lama's statement denying abduction from Tibet. Press reports from New Delhi state that on 27 April the Chinese Communists had officially protested the defacing of Mao Tse-tung's picture by an Indian mob.

Prime Minister Nehru, angered by Chinese Communist attacks on India despite his efforts to calm the situation, has accused Peiping of using the "language of the cold war." He said Peiping's charges against India were "so fantastic I find it difficult to deal with them." He stated that he had made a formal protest to Peiping. Nehru apparently believes that his past efforts to avoid recriminations have been interpreted in Peiping as a sign of weakness and intends to make Communist China aware that such charges could have serious effects on Sino-Indian relations. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1



Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400400001-8

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Prospects for Left-Wing Victory in Singapore Elections Enhanced

(Failure of the conservative political parties in Singapore to reach agreement on a unified slate for the 30 May general elections has greatly enhanced the prospects of the Communist-infiltrated People's Action party (PAP). Party officials now believe the PAP will win 30 to 40 of the 51 Legislative Assembly seats at stake. The party's strong list of candidates includes the popular former mayor, Ong Eng Guan, and 12 city councilors who resigned from office on 18 April. The PAP apparently has avoided serious competition from other left-wing parties.)

(The other Singapore parties have nominated numerous competing candidates despite Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock's plans to form an anti-PAP coalition to prevent fragmentation of the moderate vote. Lim's moderate Singapore People's Alliance nominated 39 candidates and the conservative Liberal Socialists 32. In addition, there are 34 independent candidates as well as nominees representing ten other parties. Even Lim may have trouble retaining a Legislative Assembly seat in his supposedly "safe" district. The PAP candidate in this contest may slip through with a plurality victory while Lim splits the non-PAP votes with his bitter enemy, former Chief Minister David Marshall, and with a Liberal Socialist candidate.)

(Chief Minister Lim may be able to force the withdrawal of some of the moderate candidates. It is doubtful, however, if any action taken by him at this late date, short of instigating disorders to force postponement of the elections, can reverse the trend toward a PAP victory.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400400001-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400400001-8

25X1

### The Situation in Panama

The prompt reaction of other American countries to the recent invasion of Panama has probably strengthened the unstable De la Guardia government and discouraged support for the invaders from other antiadministration groups. The Cuban origin of the armed expedition and of most of its members, as well as the apparent lack of feasible postinvasion plans, has probably made De la Guardia's numerous opponents wary of any appearance of cooperation with the invaders.

The Council of the Organization of American States in response to Panamanian appeals for help, sent an investigating committee on 28 April and recommended that member states entertain favorably Panamanian requests for arms. Nicaragua and Guatemala have offered to send military aid, and the US delivered arms and other equipment on 27 April for the Panamanian National Guard to use against the revolutionaries. In addition, the Cuban Government has condemned participation by its citizens in the attack and promised stringent action against them, although some Cuban officials may have been aware of the expedition preparations.

25X1

Guard commandant Vallarino, whose support of De la Guardia has been the president's main strength, has appeared doubtful of the guard's willingness and ability to fight the invasion force. He and other members of the ruling clique were extremely nervous, but the OAS actions should help to stabilize the internal situation also.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400400001-8

**THE PRESIDENT**

**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
 Scientific Adviser to the President  
 Director of the Budget  
 Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization  
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
 Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy  
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration  
 The Counselor  
 Director, International Cooperation Administration  
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense  
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
 The Secretary of the Army  
 The Secretary of the Navy  
 The Secretary of the Air Force  
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
 The Director, The Joint Staff  
 Chief of Staff, United States Army  
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army  
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of the Interior**

The Secretary of the Interior

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

**United States Information Agency**

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400400001-8

Approved For Release 2008/10/21 : CIA-RDP73T00975A004400400001-8

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2008/10/21 : CIA-RDP73T00975A004400400001-8

**TOP SECRET**